1 In fact, it is increasingly common for discussions of causal inquiry in IR to be framed in terms of a contrast between two competing philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary: empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of cross-case covariation, while SR is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. 2 According to some more recent advocates, SR complements mainstream approaches to causal inquiry. For example, Andrew Bennett argues that 'common methods in political scienceincluding but not limited to statistical analysis, formal modelling, discourse analysis, and case moving causal inquiry in IR beyond the search for regularities requires a philosophical revolution involving the widespread adoption of SR (Patomäki and Wight 2000; Kurki 2006) ? I argue that, on this question, critical realists are wrong. They make it appear that such a revolution is required by depicting SR as the principal alternative to a dominant 'positivist, or … empiricist, model of social science' (Kurki 2006: 195) . This vision of a binary confrontation between two philosophical systems (SR and empiricism), each with a distinctive methodological corollary, gives a misleading impression of what is at stake for IR in philosophical debates about causation. The issue at stake in IR is not the directly philosophical one of whether individual researchers embrace SR for, as Fred Chernoff has argued, this will not necessarily affect the conduct of inquiry (2002; 2009b) . What is at stake is the methodological question of whether causal inquiry in IR must be organized around a focus on regularities (or patterns of cross-case covariation) observable in the world around us, that is, in everyday world politics. And what debates about causal inquiry in IR have so far overlooked is that empiricists need not, and perhaps should not, endorse this focus. As I will show, mainstream approaches look just as problematic from the perspective of contemporary empiricism as they do to scientific realists. Far from endorsing competing methodological visions, empiricist and scientific realist philosophers of science share a common understanding of scientific practice, one from which mainstream approaches to causal inquiry in IR depart significantly.
While empiricism (especially as it is linked to positivism) has often been a target for criticism in IR, most notably in the context of the 'third debate' (see Smith 1996) , there continues to be a lack of clarity about what empiricism is and hence about which practices of causal inquiry in IR, if any, are distinctively empiricist. Typically, critics of empiricism employ the term either as a catch-all for methodological approaches to which they object (roughly, those which Jackson (2011) terms 'neopositivist') or to denote arguments associated with the logical positivist (and logical empiricist) movement of the early-to mid-twentieth century. 3 The subsequent transformation in empiricist philosophy of science, led by Bas van Fraassen (1980 , has largely been ignored (though Chernoff's work is a notable exception (see especially 2002, 2009b, 2014) ). My aim is therefore to develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in IR of Van Fraassen's empiricism and how it differs from SR. In light of that, I
consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry in IR along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. 4 I focus particularly on what role the search for regularities may play in causal inquiry, both because this is central to critical realist objections to mainstream approaches in IR, and also because critical realists argue that we can make progress on other questions, such as the relationship between agents and structures (see Wight 2006) , or whether reasons can be causes (see Kurki 2008) , only once we move beyond a narrow focus on regularities.
I show that whereas critical realists suppose that empiricism entails a problematic 'conception of "scientific methods"' (Kurki 2006: 211) , this is not true of Van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism' (1980) -his rejection of SR does not lead him to advance a competing model of scientific inquiry. Any departure from the model of scientific inquiry employed in natural science is as much a departure from contemporary empiricism as it is from SR. One lesson 3 The same is true of 'positivism ' (see Johnson 2006: 224-5) . 4 Contemporary empiricist philosophy of science focuses on natural rather than social science. However, scientific realists such as Bhaskar (2008) seek to discredit empiricism as a basis for causal inquiry in the social sciences by showing that it cannot provide a coherent account of natural science. How contemporary empiricist philosophers of science make sense of natural scientific practice is therefore directly relevant to the critical realist case against empiricism in IR.
which emerges from a closer appreciation of Van Fraassen's empiricism is hence that it is not necessary to embrace SR in order to develop a critique, grounded in contemporary philosophy of science, of the pursuit of covering-law explanations and the associated focus on identifying patterns of cross-case covariation which dominates mainstream IR today (see Jackson 2011) . A second lesson, which has not been widely noticed in IR, is that approaches such as those articulated by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994) , Stephen van Evera (1997) ,
and John Gerring (2005) , which are widely construed as 'empiricist' (see Kurki 2008: 103; Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 419) , are troublingly dislocated from the philosophical position with which they are most often identified.
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In developing this argument, I proceed as follows. The first section summarizes the argument for SR and against empiricism which is employed by critical realists in IR, distinguishing its methodological and metaphysical components. realists' most important argument, viz. that the methodological assumptions which appear to underpin most mainstream approaches to causal inquiry in IR lack philosophical support.
Scientific and Critical Realism
To be a realist about something is to hold that it is real -that it exists (Chakravartty 2011) .
Most IR theorists are therefore empirical or common-sense realists (Joseph 2007: 345-6; Chernoff 2009b: 373) : they hold that the observable objects encountered in everyday life are real. The same is true of empiricist philosophers -rejecting SR does not mean rejecting this kind of realism (Chernoff 2002: 191) . What is at issue between scientific realists and empiricists is the reality of the unobservable entities, properties, and relations (including causality) that feature in ordinary scientific discourse (Chernoff 2007: 400) . Scientific realists hold that at least some of these are real, though they disagree about which (Chakravartty 2011 ) -consequently, SR can take a wide variety of forms (Chernoff 2002: 191) . Most scientific realists in IR, however, subscribe to both entity realism and causal realism: they endorse realism both about the unobservable entities postulated in our best scientific theories and about the putative causal powers of observable and unobservable objects.
As Chernoff points out, most scientific realist philosophers of science are (like their empiricist counterparts) concerned with the natural rather than the social sciences. Moreover, acceptance of SR in relation to well-established natural scientific theories does not entail acceptance of SR in the social sciences (2002: 197-8 Bhaskar's principal criticism of empiricism is that it subscribes to a 'Humean theory of causal laws', according to which 'a constant conjunction of events' is a 'necessary condition for a scientific law ' (2008: 12) . This theory, he argues, is inadequate not only for the social sciences, but also as an account of natural science. That is because it fails to distinguish between the 6 Chernoff notes that presentations of SR in IR often conflate SR and CR, thereby wrongly giving the impression that scientific realist philosophers of (natural) science would endorse the arguments of critical realists in IR (2007: 400) . 7 Other arguments for SR are available. One prominent example, which has been discussed in IR (see Wendt 1999: 62-3; Wight 2007: 386-7 ; see also Chernoff 2002: 193-4) , is inference to the best explanation. This is rejected by Van Fraassen (1980: 19-23; see also Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and Van Fraassen 1997) .
'closed systems' in which constant conjunctions are found and 'open systems' in which they are not found; and this distinction is important because the world encountered in everyday experience is not a closed system -in fact, most closed systems are artificially created by scientists in experiments (Bhaskar 2008: 13-14 ; see also Cartwright 1999: 2-3). Bhaskar's point is that scientists conduct experiments because the world around us is mostly open-systemic:
'an experiment is necessary precisely to the extent that the pattern of events forthcoming under experimental conditions would not be forthcoming without it ' (2008: 33) .
It follows from this simple observation about why scientists conduct experiments that 'universal empirical generalizations' are unlikely to be found (Bhaskar 2008: 15) . What Bhaskar terms 'invariances' are only 'scientifically significant' when 'generated under conditions which are artificially produced and controlled ' (2008: 20) . And it follows from this that the idea, which is widespread in IR (and political science), that social scientists should search for regularities of the form 'if A then always B', or 'if A then sometimes B, with probability X' (Van Evera 1997: 8), must be flawed, at least if such regularities are held to apply both under controlled conditions and also in everyday life. 8 For although we may identify deterministic or probabilistic relationships between particular experimental manipulations and particular outcomes, we do not expect these relationships to hold outside controlled conditions.
Consider, for example, the effect of gravity on a falling feather: inside a vacuum chamber, the feather falls at the same rate as a bowling ball but, because of atmospheric resistance, we do not expect this to be replicated in everyday conditions. We could only expect regularities observed under controlled conditions also to hold outside those conditions if the world around us were a closed system -but in that case, it would not be necessary to conduct experiments. observed in open systems (Bhaskar 2008: 17) .
In subsequent work, Bhaskar (2015) built this argument for SR into CR, an approach to causal inquiry in the social sciences which takes seriously the emergent reality of social formations and the need to study the 'persistent relations between the various planes of activity that constitute, and causally impact upon, social life' (Wight 2006: 48 Chernoff has previously criticized arguments against empiricism and other anti-realist positions by scientific realists in IR, contending that they often mischaracterize debates in contemporary philosophy of science (2002: 196-9; see also 2007; 2009b; 2014: 34-8 2002: 203; 2009a: 177; 2009b: 383) . By contrast, I focus more narrowly on Van Fraassen's defence of an empiricism which resists both entity and causal realism, but without embracing instrumentalism.
The objects of scientific inquiry
Like Bhaskar, Milja Kurki identifies empiricism with a 'Humean conception of causation ' (2008: 6) which implies that 'causal relations are regularity relations of patterns of observables', such that 'when A type of events take place, B type of events can be assumed to follow (at least probabilistically)'. Consequently, causal analysis is tied 'to the study of patterns of regularities in the world around us ' (2008: 6) . Like Bhaskar, moreover, she regards this conception of causation as ontologically impoverished. She insists that 'observed regularities do not constitute causality: causality consists in the underlying causal powers' which regularities observed under experimental conditions allow us to identify (2008: 198) . In other words, the objects of scientific inquiry are not, as empiricists think, regularities, but rather real causal powers.
According to Kurki, this matters because it has methodological consequences. The impact of the empiricist conception of causation on the social sciences has been the development of an understanding of science as being 'about finding falsifiable, predictive, observation-based regularities' -'most social scientists are … adamant that only careful observation of regularities (even if of "localised" regularities) can give us an adequate understanding of human action and society ' (2006: 193-4) . Kenneth Waltz, for example, claimed that in order to construct a 'theory of international politics' one must first 'conceive of international politics as a bounded realm or domain; second … discover some law-like regularities within it; and third … develop a way of explaining the observed regularities ' (1979: 116) . Consequently, Kurki argues, empiricists are unable to do justice to causes which are unobservable or which do not show up in stable regularities, such as 'ideas, meanings and reasons ' (2006: 203; see also Shapiro and Wendt 1992; Wight 2006) . This has led to a methodological divide in IR in which, rather than submitting to the 'straightjacket' which a focus on regularities imposes upon causal inquiry, many interpretive and critical scholars have 'rejected the validity of causal analysis altogether ' (2006: 200) . Kurki argues, however, that because SR accepts '[r]easons and motivations as well as rules, norms and discourses' as 'legitimate objects' of social scientific inquiry it can 'help forge constructive links between theoretical camps in the "divided discipline" of IR ' (2006: 211, 190 ; see also Patomäki and Wight 2000) .
One putative problem with treating regularities as the principal objects of scientific inquiry is hence that it renders empiricism unable to support inquiry into kinds of unobservable factors that are widely encountered in the social world. However, Kurki's characterization of empiricism as searching for regularities in the world around us also raises a further question, viz. what is the warrant for believing that such regularities are causally significant? We know that regularities observed in artificially closed experimental conditions are causally significant because when the interference of other factors is ruled out, the factor that is manipulated is the only thing that could have produced the observed outcome (see Bhaskar 2008: 53; Cartwright 1983: 6) . This logic can also be applied to randomized controlled trials and to natural experiments. 10 Outside of such conditions, however, we cannot be sure that any regular pattern which may be observed is not a product of chance, or of equifinality (of there being multiple possible causal routes to the same outcome). Consequently, the covariation of two factors does not strictly imply the presence of a causal relationship between them -we can draw compelling inferences about causal relationships only from patterns of covariation observed under controlled conditions (whether artificial or naturally occurring). This applies even to probabilistic laws: a pattern of covariation definitively indicates the presence of a causal law which holds probabilistically only if it can be shown to hold probabilistically under controlled conditions.
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The interpretation of scientific theories
Critical realists also reject what they take to be an empiricist interpretation of scientific theories. For while Kurki argues that its focus on regularities renders empiricism unable to do justice to unobservable factors, many widely accepted scientific theories do in fact invoke unobservable entities, such as sub-atomic particles. According to Colin Wight (2007) , the instrumental fashion in which empiricists make sense of this feature of science restricts the scope of causal inquiry.
Instrumentalism is the doctrine that theoretical claims about unobservable entities should be interpreted instrumentally -as purely theoretical assumptions which (i) do not have truth values (and hence do not make existential assertions) and (ii) are included in scientific theories purely based on their contribution to explanatory and predictive success (Chakravartty 2007: natural experiment in which the factor which differs must be the cause of the outcome to be explained (Sekhon 2004: 283) . 11 There is therefore a significant difference between a pattern observed under everyday conditions, in which Bs sometimes, but not always, follow As, and a probabilistic law, in which Bs follow As with a specified probability, under controlled conditions. 10-11). Its potential appeal is that it appears to make sense of the explanatory power of scientific theories in which assumptions about unobservable entities appear without requiring a commitment to entity realism. Scientific realists argue, however, that instrumentalism has a significant methodological cost. Because instrumentalists deny that theoretical assumptions about unobservable entities refer to anything real, when they invoke theories containing those assumptions in explanations they must reason in an 'as-if' fashion (Wendt 1999 : 61) -they can explain only that what happened was as if the theory's assumptions were true. Consequently, the unobservable entities which those assumptions postulate never themselves become objects of investigation. Whereas scientific realists will question whether such entities are indeed as described in scientific theories, instrumentalism forecloses this avenue of inquiry (Wight 2007: 381, 383, 393-4) . In short, instrumentalism makes science 'conservative': by exempting knowledge claims about unobservables 'from criticism', it limits the scope of scientific inquiry (Bhaskar 2008: 42-3 ).
Waltz's conception of the structure of the international political system constitutes the most widely discussed example of this problem in IR. Waltz argued that theoretical 'assumptions are not assertions of fact. They are neither true nor false. Theoretical notions find their justification in the success of the theories that employ them ' (1979: 6) . Scientific realists contend that the deficiencies of this instrumentalism emerge in the substance of neorealist theory. Wendt (1987) argues that Waltz's definition of structure in terms of the distribution of capabilities among functionally equal units in an anarchic system (see Waltz 1979: 88-99) effectively reduces it to a property of states, viz. their capabilities. This is adequate for Waltz's purposes insofar as it enables him to distinguish between bipolar and multipolar systems and hence to articulate his central theoretical claim: that the former are more stable than the latter. Wendt argues, however, that Waltz's definition leaves neorealism unable to illuminate how structure might help to generate states as actors (1987) . In short, because Waltz treats structure as a theoretical instrument the incorporation of which into neorealist theory is justified purely by its contribution to the prediction of system-wide outcomes, he fails to explore its generative potential.
How science explains
A third aspect of empiricism which is widely criticized on methodological grounds is its approach to explanation. This is typically assumed to be some version of beg patience -it is precisely the similarities between SR and constructive empiricism which I consider significant, for they bring into the question the critical realist claim that it matters for causal inquiry in IR whether those conducting the inquiry are scientific realists or empiricists.
Constructive empiricism and the objects of scientific inquiry:
Van Fraassen asserts that science aims to 'save the phenomena' and that 'regularities in the observable phenomena' are 'the scientist's basic topic of concern ' (1980: 4, 70 universality'. In everyday life, 'we are liable to find only putative laws heavily subject to unwritten ceteris paribus qualifications': 'all crows are black -except albinos; water boils at 100°C -provided atmospheric pressure is normal; a falling body accelerates -provided it is not intercepted … and so forth ' (1980: 32; see also Cartwright 1983: 89) .
In short, science does not principally consist in a search for regularities in the world round us.
In order to discover the kinds of regularities scientists are interested in, Van Fraassen argues, 'one needs experimentation ' (1980: 73ff) . He notes, moreover, that these kinds of regularities 'are exceedingly subtle and complex, so experimental design is exceedingly difficult'.
Consequently, 'the very search for new and deeper empirical regularities becomes couched in theoretical language ' (1980: 73 relates not at all to our epistemic attitudes towards theories, nor to the aim we pursue in constructing theories, but only to the correct understanding of what a theory says … After deciding that the language of science must be literally understood, we can still say that there is no need to believe good theories to be true, nor to believe ipso facto that the entities they postulate are real. (1980: 11-12) In other words, scientists can accept a theory and construe it literally while at the same time '"bracketing" its ontological implications ' (1980: 81) .
On first inspection, this may sound unpersuasive. Most scientists, we may suppose, are entity realists -they believe (some of) the theories they accept to be true and hence believe that (some of) the unobservable entities to which they refer exist. Yet Van Fraassen would accept this! He is not concerned with what scientists in fact believe, but rather with whether it is necessary, for science, that scientists believe the theories they accept to be true in what they say about the unobservable parts of the world. His view is that the extent of belief required for theory acceptance is less than scientific realists suggest -scientists can coherently resist entity realism by remaining 'agnostic about the existence of the unobservable aspects of the world described by science ' (1980: 72) .
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Van Fraassen therefore presents an alternative account of theory acceptance. Accepting a theory must, he notes, involve belief that it is 'empirically adequate' -that it is true in 'what it says about the observable things and events in the world ' (1980: 12) . No scientist can accept a theory that they do not believe at least to this extent. Accepting a theory also involves 'a commitment to confront any future phenomena' with the 'conceptual resources' which that theory provides (1980: 12) . This commitment compels scientists to 'immerse' themselves in the 'world-picture' the theory constructs and also in its language, including language which indexes unobservable entities (1980: 81) -scientists will therefore respond to questions about the world in the language of and by reference to the picture given by the theories they accept. 17 An anonymous reviewer suggested that while Van Fraassen may not be an instrumentalist about the assumptions within scientific theories (because he regards them as having truth values) he is, nonetheless, an instrumentalist about theories themselves (insofar as he holds that they should be evaluated on grounds other than their truth), which makes him a kind of pragmatist. Van Fraassen acknowledges that there is a 'pragmatic aspect' to theory acceptance, because it comes with a commitment 'to seeing nature' through a 'theory's eyes' -an accepted theory is a 'guide both to theoretical and practical life ' (2001: 164; see also 1980: 87-8) . His key claim, though, is that while scientific theories do make truth claims about the unobservable entities to which they refer (which rules out instrumentalism), we cannot directly evaluate them -consequently, we can accept theories which make such claims as guides while withholding belief that those claims are true.
is not necessary for, science (1985: 255) . 18 Significantly, it follows from this that there is no theory which a realist-inclined scientist can accept which an agnostic cannot accept. This is because a theory which is (believed to be) true and is hence acceptable to the former is also, therefore, (believed to be) empirically adequate and is hence equally acceptable to the latter. 18 An empiricist may, therefore, believe in the reality of (some) unobservables, so long as she acknowledges that this belief is supererogatory. 19 As van Fraassen acknowledges, this means that accepting a theory requires an epistemological commitment that extends beyond the evidence. He denies, however, that this opens the door to SR, for 'it is not an epistemological principle that one might as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb ' (1980: 72 ' (1983: 91, 5) . 22 In other words, if we accept an explanation which invokes an unobservable entity, then that implies a commitment to the reality of that entity. Van Fraassen disagrees. He points out that explanations are always relative to some theory and argues that the fact that a theory can explain some outcome is not a reason to believe it to be true (1980: 100). In other words, we 20 Van Fraassen in fact questions the 'adequacy of the terminology of cause and causality' to describe the picture science gives us (1980: 123-4) . He does, however, accept that use of this terminology constitutes a normal part of science. I discuss this further below. 21 Van Fraassen's analysis of explanation focuses on how we determine which are the salient factors; he argues that an explanation is best understood as 'an answer to a why-question ' (1980: 134) and hence that salience is pragmatically determined. On the significance of this insight for the evaluation of competing causal explanations in IR see Grynaviski (2013) , Chernoff (2014), and Humphreys (2017b) . 22 On the utility of Cartwright's distinction between identifying causes and putting them to work in causal explanations for thinking about the nature of causal explanation in IR see Jackson (2017) .
can accept an explanation which invokes an unobservable entity while remaining agnostic about whether that entity exists. This difference does not, however, lead constructive empiricists to offer different explanations than scientific realists do (cf Chernoff 2014: 256) -they differ over the extent of belief science requires in the theories on which explanations draw, not over the world-picture those theories generate.
Regularities and causal powers
The preceding analysis suggests that constructive empiricism differs from SR far less strongly than is suggested by scientific realist arguments against empiricism in IR. Van Fraassen describes scientists as (i) immersed in theories which (ii) typically go beyond what is observable and (iii) are developed largely through experimentation. He also notes (iv) that these theories provide the scientific world-picture that is put to work in explanations. He agrees with scientific realists (v) that any claims such theories make about unobservable entities must be construed literally, but notes (vi) that belief that such theories are not only empirically adequate but also true in what they say about unobservable entities makes no difference to the evidence which counts in favour of them and hence argues (vii) that such belief is supererogatory. What makes this a distinctively empiricist position is neither the scientific method nor the theoretical world-picture it commends, but rather its epistemological modesty (see 1985; 2002) -Van Fraassen interprets science as requiring less belief for theory acceptance than scientific realists do, and hence denies that it requires a commitment to entity realism. Like SR, however, constructive empiricism is 'non-revisionary' with regard to scientific practice -it aims to render that practice philosophically intelligible, but does not seek to change it (Rosen 1994: 156) . Consequently, constructive empiricism and SR offer competing interpretations of scientific practice, not competing prescriptions for it.
Nonetheless, a puzzle remains. Van Fraassen's characterization of science as seeking to discover regularities may not have the methodological implications that critical realists suppose, but it contrasts sharply with Bhaskar's argument that science is intelligible only if the invariances discovered in experiments are construed as evidence of underlying causal powers.
Van Fraassen argues, in effect, that science may be understood as merely identifying regularities -that we are not compelled to construe these regularities as the manifestation of underlying causal powers. In other words, he seeks to resist not only entity realism, but also causal realism (see 1980; 1989) .
I do not seek to resolve this debate. Rather, the question I consider is how much of a difference for causal inquiry these competing metaphysical stances make, when considered in their own right. This question has received hardly any attention in IR, for the presumption, among critical realists, has been that the metaphysical disagreements between empiricists and scientific realists will be accompanied by methodological differences, differences which will handicap an empiricist approach to causal inquiry. Yet Van Fraassen argues that we can, without cost, sidestep metaphysical issues. In other words, whereas Bhaskar argues that we can only make sense of the practice of science on the supposition that causal powers are real,
Van Fraassen argues that we can do without this supposition and still get on with the business of science. If so, then this further undermines the contention that embracing SR will open up new avenues of causal inquiry, as compared to empiricism.
Van Fraassen recognizes, of course, that 'when scientists describe the world they do so in causal discourse ' (1993: 438) . When explaining what their theories show, for example, scientists often use causal terminology, describing theoretical models as containing 'causal mechanisms ' (1980: 80) and describing the picture of the world given by science and put to work in explanations in causal terms (1980: 123-4) . But Van Fraassen questions whether this reveals anything about the world as it is independent of science. He identifies an alternative possibility -scientists' causal discourse might describe 'features of our models, not features of the world ' (1989: 214) . In other words, scientists' causal discourse may be just a way of talking about what science shows, a way of talking that does not in fact latch on to any feature of the world as it is independent of science. However, this is not an argument for causal idealismVan Fraassen does not deny that causal powers are real (1993: 435) . 23 Rather, he defends an agnostic position, withholding judgement on whether scientists' causal discourse latches onto features of the world as it is independent of science. beyond what is actual and observable, as a demand which plays no role in the scientific enterprise ' (1980: 203) . He is happy simply to say: 'that the observable phenomena exhibit these regularities … is merely a brute fact, and may or may not have an explanation in terms of unobservable facts "behind the phenomena" ' (1980: 24 1980: 205-7, 213) . In short, causal realists and agnostics stop in a different place -whereas causal realists seek to explain why there are 23 For a defence of causal idealism in IR see Lebow (2014) . 24 He is therefore not guilty of what Bhaskar (2008: 36) terms an 'epistemic fallacy'.
regularities but consider it unnecessary to explain why there are causal powers, Van Fraassen considers it unnecessary to explain why there are regularities.
Second, whereas Bhaskar holds that the exportation of experimental results to everyday settings is intelligible only on the supposition that experiments identify real causal powers, Van
Fraassen denies that science's success in manipulating the world requires explaining. He is happy to observe simply that '[o] nly the successful theories survive -the ones which in fact latched on to actual regularities in nature ' (1980: 40) . Consider, once again, the case of the feather when it falls under everyday conditions. In such cases, Clarke notes, most 'scientists don't hesitate to claim that the universal law of gravity continues to apply', even though they are 'unable to incorporate the force of gravity and the forces of wind in an accurate model' (2010: 302) . 25 Yet this does not reveal anything about the world as it is independent of science (see Clarke 2010: 313-4) . If scientists do suppose that regularities hold outside the conditions under which they are identified, this may amount to no more than a promissory note, indicating an expectation that science will one day be able to model how forces combine in open systems. 26 Even if the supposition is based on a belief that the world consists of real causal powers, Van Fraassen regards such beliefs as supererogatory. At the heart of his position is a contention that observable phenomena cannot adjudicate the truth or falsity of claims about causal powers (1980: 2) and hence that we can remain agnostic about such claims. 25 Clarke is actually discussing Neurath's example of a falling bank note, but the idea is the same. 26 Cartwright (1999) identifies yet another possibility -that scientific laws only hold locally (see also Cartwright 2010 produced by the short circuit, the size and orientation of the conductor, and the size of the earth's electro-magnetic field, the 'theory of electro-magnetism allows us to calculate the force exerted on the conductor at the time' of the short circuit (1980: 102) . In his example, doing this calculation reveals that the surge in current generated a significant increase in the downward force exerted on the (horizontal) conductor by the earth's electro-magnetic field.
This leads him to argue that the warping is explained by the short circuit. On this question, Van Fraassen and Cartwright will give different answers. Whereas Cartwright will say that regularities in electrical phenomena hold in virtue of the causal capacities that produce them, Van Fraassen will acknowledge that some scientists certainly describe things in these terms, but will prefer to remain agnostic about whether such capacities are features of the world as it is independent of science.
As with their epistemological difference over the extent of belief required to accept a scientific theory, this metaphysical difference between constructive empiricism and SR is philosophically significant. However, insofar as Van Fraassen and Cartwright accept the same theories and put them to work in relation to the same problems, they are likely to offer the same explanations.
It is, in other words, far from obvious that embracing causal realism will make a substantive difference for causal inquiry. Certainly, scientific realists in IR have not demonstrated that it does make such a difference, for their presumption has been that empiricists are unable to accept the same theories and offer the same explanations as scientific realists. This is not true of the kind of empiricism defended in contemporary philosophy of science.
What's at stake for causal inquiry in IR?
Critical realists in IR construe empiricism as being differentiated from SR both by the kinds of theories it can accept and also, consequently, by the scientific method it endorses, viz. the search for regularities in the world around us. This makes it appear that the difference between the two positions has substantive implications for causal inquiry in IR. However, in contemporary philosophy of science empiricists and scientific realists do not systematically disagree either about which theories should be accepted or about the practice of scientific inquiry. Their epistemological and metaphysical differences lead them to offer competing interpretations of scientific practice (specifically: of the aims of science, of the extent of belief required to accept scientific theories, and of what science reveals about underlying causal powers), but they do not offer competing prescriptions for it. Viewing the realist-empiricist debate in philosophy of science as a binary confrontation between philosophical systems, each with a distinctive methodology corollary, is therefore misleading.
Wendt appears to recognize this when he observes that 'realist and anti-realist physicists disagree about the ontological status of quarks, but this does not affect their research'. He argues, however, that this kind of disagreement does affect research in the social sciences. This is because 'social scientists are less confident than physicists about what their practice should look like, and have often turned to philosophers for methodological guidance ' (1999: 48) . However, he describes social scientists as turning to outdated forms of anti-realism, notably logical empiricism (see also Shapiro and Wendt 1992; Chernoff 2002: 199 These methodological demands are, moreover, made in the name of 'scientific research' (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 7). Jackson exposes the potential problem with such claimsappeals to 'science' in IR tend to serve 'a disciplining function', privileging particular modes of inquiry in the name of 'science' (2011: 9-10). He argues, therefore, that the problem with King, Keohane, and Verba's invocation of 'science' is that they prescribe a logic of inquiry which they claim is applicable to 'all good research ' (1994: 4) , whereas really what they are prescribing is a logic of inquiry for 'all good neopositivist research' (Jackson 2011: 67) . Yet the reality is starker than Jackson suggests, for a comparison of their prescriptions with Van
Fraassen's understanding of scientific inquiry reveals the extent to which their prescriptions depart even from contemporary empiricist philosophy of science. We are, in short, confronted with a hegemonic practice which departs considerably from the closest supporting arguments 30 At best, this holds only in relation to closed systems. In posing these question, I do not mean to imply that powerful answers cannot be provided. It is, though, pertinent to note that these are all areas in which there has been innovative work by philosophically-oriented scholars in IR, both from a critical realist perspective and from 
Conclusion
To many, SR may be intuitively attractive. Many scientists will believe that (some of) the unobservable entities postulated in their theories are real and that scientific theories identify real causal powers in the world as it is independent of science. From the point of view of the debate between SR and constructive empiricism, however, this is beside the point. What is directly at stake in that debate is not what scientists in fact believe, but rather (i) the extent of belief required to accept a scientific theory, that is, whether scientists are rationally compelled to be entity realists and (ii) whether scientists must be causal realists, that is, conceive of science as identifying real causal powers. The question for IR is what difference, if any, the divergent stances taken on these issues by scientific realists and empiricists make for the conduct of causal inquiry.
I have argued that the critical realist call for a philosophical revolution in which SR replaces empiricism as the basis for causal inquiry in IR is misleading as to the methodological significance of the philosophical differences between SR and empiricism. One reason this has not been recognized in IR is that the extent to which empiricist philosophy of science has been
